

#3-70

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

21 JAN 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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21 January 1970
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FBIS TRENDS
21 JANUARY 1970

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 12 - 18 JANUARY 1970

Moscow (3544 items)

| | | |
|--------------------|------|----|
| Criticism of China | (2%) | 6% |
| Vietnam | (4%) | 3% |
| Foreign Ministry | (--) | 3% |
| Press Conference | | |
| Middle East | (3%) | 3% |
| Nigeria-Biafra | (--) | 2% |
| War's End | | |
| Agnew's Asian Tour | (3%) | 1% |

Peking (2536 items)

| | | |
|-----------------------|--------|-----|
| Domestic Issues | (53%) | 56% |
| Indian People's | (5%) | 5% |
| Armed Struggles | | |
| Agnew's Asian Tour | (0.5%) | 4% |
| [Taiwan Visit | (0.5%) | 3%] |
| Tanzania Independence | (--) | 2% |
| Anniversary | | |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Vietnamese communist attention to the 50th session of the Paris talks on 15 January is again confined to accounts of the session which gloss over most of the substance of the allied speeches and focus on the PRG and DRV delegates' continuing attacks on the Vietnamization policy and allied "crimes." Having ignored Ambassador Habib's 8 January renewal of the proposal for restricted sessions, VNA's report of his 15 January remarks says cryptically that he "repeated" the "old proposal" for restricted sessions as well as discussing the prisoner-of-war problem.

There is no comment pegged to the current Paris sessions,* but a two-installment Liberation Radio commentary, broadcast on 17 and 18 January, assesses the communists' diplomatic struggle, which it says will not replace the "military and political struggles." Routinely claiming that President Nixon has continued "Johnson's aggressive line," the commentary says that during 50 Paris sessions the United States' argument has been that it has assisted its ally in "struggling against North Vietnam aggressors." The first anniversary of the Nixon Administration also provides the peg for Hanoi and Front commentators to charge "a lack of good will" toward the Paris talks.

A spate of current comment stresses the need to step up the political struggle in coordination with the military struggle in order to combat pacification and the Vietnamization policy. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 19th, discusses how military action can aid the people to rise up and build revolutionary administrations and how these "liberated" areas then provide a rear base for the military forces. An editorial in the Front organ GIAI PHONG (Liberation), broadcast by Liberation Radio on 15 January, says it is necessary to "urgently step up the guerrilla war into a new high tide with a mass character and in close cooperation with political and proselyting activities."

Stepping up the "political offensive and proselyting work" during Tet is dealt with in a 4 January circular put out by the PRG Information and Culture Ministry and the NFLSV, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 15th. On the same day, the radio broadcasts a commentary linked to the 5 January PRG announcement of a Tet cease-fire which urges people to use the time to persuade people to "leave the enemy for the national ranks."

* The last monitored comment to discuss a specific Paris session in substance was a Liberation Radio commentary on 29 November 1969.

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Attention to current military activity remains confined to scattered battle reports with stress on the northern provinces. At the same time, there is continued attention to alleged communist military victories during 1969.

Moscow continues to criticize the U.S. Vietnamization program and to denigrate the sincerity of the U.S. intention to withdraw troops. On the 19th Moscow radio broadcasts Christmas messages from U.S. prisoners in the DRV. The messages had been previously broadcast by Hanoi, and Moscow explains that Hanoi had loaned it the recordings.

Attention to the situation in the North includes a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest which charges the United States with using B-52's against the demilitarized zone. On 20 January, VNA reports the release of a DRV War Crimes Commission statement of the 17th which rounds up alleged crimes against the Vietnamese people since President Nixon's inauguration.

A flurry of propaganda anticipating the celebration of the Vietnam Workers Party's 40th anniversary on 3 February includes a Secretariat circular, released on the 18th, which sets out rules for commemorating the anniversary; party slogans hailing the anniversary are also released on the 18th. A 13 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, while lauding party achievements in the past 40 years, goes to unusual lengths to stress the importance of determination and a "staunch spirit" among party members in the army and seems to reflect concern over their attitude.

DRV Government meetings are reported by VNA, which mentions a 14 January National Assembly Standing Committee meeting under Chairman Truong Chinh and a "recent" Council of Ministers meeting held "to discuss and adopt the draft state budget for 1970."

The 20th anniversary of CPR recognition of the DRV is marked by a NHAN DAN editorial, summarized by VNA on the 18th, and a 20 January reception held by the Chinese ambassador in Hanoi, reported by NCNA. Nguyen Duy Trinh and the ambassador spoke at the reception.

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PARIS SESSION ON 15 JANUARY: "CRIMES," VIETNAMIZATION

ALLIED VNA says that at the 15 January Paris session the U.S. and
SPEECHES GVN delegates "took turns in boasting about goodwill" and
charged the DRV and PRG with blocking progress in the talks.
As for GVN Ambassador Phong's presentation, VNA says simply that he
"rehashed threadbare allegations." While the VNA account of the 49th
session on the 8th had totally ignored Ambassador Habib's proposal for
restricted sessions, the VNA account of the U.S. delegate's statement
on the 15th says Habib "repeated the old proposal for restricted
sessions and the prisoners-of-war problem which had been laid bare and
rejected" by the DRV and PRG delegations.

PRG, DRV ON Deputy PRG delegation head Dinh Ba Thi, again
U.S. "CRIMES" substituting for the reportedly still ailing Mme. Nguyen
Thi Binh, devoted a considerable portion of his state-
ment to denouncing alleged U.S. crimes in the South since President Nixon's
inauguration. Thi claimed that "innumerable crimes"* were committed in
the implementation of Vietnamization, particularly during the course of
the Phoenix campaign and the accelerated pacification campaign.

The VNA account omits much of Thi's detailing of specific crimes. It
also omits Thi's brief reference to President Nixon's contention that
a precipitate U.S. withdrawal would result in a "massacre" by the
communists. But VNA reports Ha Van Lau's remark to this effect and his
comment that the President is using this contention as "a pretext" to
oppose a "correct political solution to the war." VNA omits Ha Van Lau's
specific acknowledgment of allied charges of PLAF slaughters in Hue
during the 1968 Tet offensive, noting only that he said the United States
is trying to mislead public opinion by claiming that the "PLAF" had
committed mass slaughters."

VIETNAMIZATION In noting that Lau again denounced the Vietnamization
plan, VNA reports his remarks that the President's
three criteria for troop withdrawal--which are not spelled out this
time--can "never be met" and that Vietnamization is aimed at "indefinitely"
prolonging U.S. military occupation of South Vietnam by hundreds of

* Thi's current documentation of U.S. "crimes" seems to be based on some
of the statistics in the DRV War Crimes Commission statement which VNA
on 20 January says was issued on the 17th, two days after Thi's statement.
There is no propaganda acknowledgment that in Paris, also on the 15th,
the communists released the names of the alleged victims of the 1968
Son My "massacre" which were recently transmitted by Front and DRV media.

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thousands of troops. VNA does not report any of Lau's remarks on the President's three troop withdrawal announcements--at Midway in June, on 16 September, and on 15 December. VNA does report that Lau characterized as a "deceitful trick" President Nixon's "rash challenge" at his 19 June press conference when he said he hoped to beat former Secretary Clifford's proposed timetable to withdraw 100,000 combat forces by the end of 1969.

The VNA account notes Dinh Ba Thi's assertions that the United States is pressuring the Saigon government to "pressgang frantically" in acquiring more troops to replace American forces. But the account does not include Thi's comment that the U.S. side seems to view the rise in South Vietnamese casualties as compared with American losses as a sign of "progress" in Vietnamization. Thi also made the routine charge that the United States is making the GVN become "more fascist" in ruthlessly repressing and terrorizing advocates of peace and those unwilling to surrender to the Americans. In this regard, VNA notes his reference to President Thieu's 9 January reported statements on Vietnamization. Thi claimed that Thieu "begged" the United States not to abandon South Vietnam and to remain there for many more years.

SELF-DETERMINATION In its account of Lau's remarks on the political issues involved in settlement, VNA notes his general denunciation of the United States for "pretending" to respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and to agree to the holding of general elections there. Lau ignored the fact that President Thieu's 11 July proposal provided for organization of elections by a mixed commission which would include Front representatives. Instead he said that "in reality" it was the Liberation Front which had "first" put forward the proposal for "organizing" general elections, as manifested in the Front's December 1960 founding program, developed in its 1967 political program, and further advanced in the NFLSV 10-point solution tabled at Paris on 8 May 1969. VNA does not carry this passage. But it does report Lau's comment that the "important question" which bears a "decisive character" is who will organize the elections; Lau said it was with this concern in mind that NFLSV-PRG has advocated the establishment of a provisional coalition government to organize them.

VNA reports the concluding remarks made by Thi and Lau calling on the United States to end its "aggressive war" and settle the South Vietnam problem on the basis of the NFLSV 10-point solution. Dinh Ba Thi's repetition of the proposal that the United States agree to withdraw in six months is noted by VNA, as is his remark that if the United States accepts the principle of troop withdrawal and the formation of a provisional coalition government, as stipulated in the Front's 10-point solution, then "all concrete problems will be discussed and settled satisfactorily."

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COMMENT ON DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE, NIXON'S FIRST YEAR

FRONT RADIO COMMENTARY The two-installment commentary broadcast by Liberation Radio on 17 and 18 January assesses the communists' diplomatic effort and U.S. policy and negotiating strategy. The commentator says flatly that "we do not expect to replace the military and political struggle with the diplomatic struggle" and that there are "no illusions" about U.S. goodwill for peace, but that nonetheless the diplomatic struggle constitutes a "resolute offensive" against the enemy. While there is no explicit definition of "diplomatic struggle," the implication is that it involves influencing American and world opinion and heightening the role and prestige of the PRG as well as engaging in talks.

The commentator denounces the U.S. "contention" that North Vietnam is invading the South and its "illogical" demand for mutual troop withdrawal and recognition of the Saigon "puppet administration" as a constitutional and legal authority. He sees U.S. policy as evolving from the argumentation in Kissinger's January 1969 FOREIGN AFFAIRS article,* but he says that using withdrawal as a "trump card" in negotiations will not work.

The commentator routinely ridicules the U.S. policy of upholding the GVN as a legal and constitutional authority and of attempting to force the Front to negotiate with it. Somewhat illogically, he goes on to say that the United States has been "compelled to recognize" the PRG and NFLSV and sit in on the negotiations with the PRG despite past American persistence in denying the Front's role. He presses routinely for the NFLSV 10-point solution, particularly the "very correct proposal" for establishment of a provisional coalition government that would hold free general elections. He contrasts this with the Saigon administration's "shrewd maneuver" whereby it would organize the elections "under the supervision of some advisory committee."

NIXON'S FIRST ANNIVERSARY The anniversary of President Nixon's inauguration prompts comment from both NHAN DAN and LPA. VNA and Hanoi radio on the 20th carry the NHAN DAN article, which claims that the President from the beginning demonstrated his lack of goodwill with regard to the Paris meeting; NHAN DAN says, for

* Vietnamese communist media have periodically commented on the Kissinger article since the initial 17 January 1969 NHAN DAN commentary. A 15 May Liberation Radio commentary took much the same tack as the current one in discussing the coordination of diplomatic struggle with the military and political struggles and in declaring that there is "no illusion regarding peace and peace talks."

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example, that he called it a "two-party conference" and appointed as chief negotiator Ambassador Lodge, "a hawk closely related to the Thieu-Ky puppet administration." The paper repeats standard denunciations of U.S. statements and positions, including the President's 14 May speech and the Vietnamization policy. The LPA commentary, also on the 20th, presents a similar assessment of the Administration and says that 1970 "does not augur well" for the President. It predicts that unless he changes his policy, "defeat will visit him both at Capitol Hill and at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue."

VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW'S ASIAN TOUR

HANOI Continuing propaganda on Vice President Agnew's Asian tour includes a NHAN DAN commentary by Le Binh on the 17th, broadcast by Hanoi that day. It lists the countries visited and the demonstrations which allegedly followed him throughout the trip. The vituperative attack on Agnew calls him a "very vulgar politician," "well-known reactionary," and former Maryland governor who advocated repression of Negroes and took advantage of his position "to make a shady fortune." It says President Nixon chose him as Vice President to win reactionary Southern votes and recalls Agnew's attacks on the press and antiwar movement. The commentary concludes, however, that the trip's "failure" has not been caused by Agnew's personality but by President Nixon's war policy. VNA's 17 January summary of the commentary deletes the personal attack on Agnew.

As in earlier propaganda, Le Binh recounts how Agnew was sent to explain the new Asian policy and Vietnamization. It says again that he "sneaked" in and out of Saigon because of fear and claims he expressed concern over the influence of the antiwar movement on U.S. troops in Vietnam.

MOSCOW Moscow comment on the conclusion of Vice President Agnew's tour, including a Kudryavtsev IZVESTIYA article on 18 January, asserts that Agnew failed in his effort to "explain" the Guam doctrine and to stop national liberation and reestablish U.S. domination in Asia. TASS' 20 January report on the Vice President's return to Washington notes that he said in his airport speech that the United States enjoys love and respect in Asia. TASS comments that this love and respect comes from "reactionary regimes" and that the anti-American demonstrations the Vice President encountered during his trip show the true sentiments of the Asian people.

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MOSCOW ON VIETNAMIZATION, TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Recent statements by U.S. officials are used as pegs in Moscow's continuing criticism of the U.S. Vietnamization program. TASS complains on the 15th that Secretary Rogers, in a TV interview the preceding day, did not give a timetable for troop withdrawal. Quoting Rogers as referring to the U.S. intention to "reduce" the number of American troops, TASS observes that "U.S. political commentators" are saying more and more often that Washington does not intend to pull out all its troops. TASS says U.S. intentions were confirmed by President Thieu's statement that it will take "many years" to withdraw all U.S. troops. Noting that Rogers said he did not know if President Nixon planned to appoint a new head of the U.S. delegation in Paris, TASS comments that this shows a U.S. intention to play down the talks.

Comment on Rogers' 18 January TV interview says that although he claimed that the war had been significantly deescalated in the past year, his remarks on troop withdrawal show that the United States plans to continue the war and seek a military solution. TASS on the 19th says his comments on the retention of some combat troops in South Vietnam to protect support troops means that the Secretary "actually confirmed" Thieu's recent statement that American troops would remain for "many years." The domestic service observes in this connection that although land forces will be "slightly reduced," Air Force and artillery firepower will be "significantly increased"; and it cites Secretary Laird as having said that the amount of bombs and shells will greatly compensate for the withdrawal of "several tens of thousands of troops."

Commenting on White House spokesman Ziegler's statement following Secretary Rogers' comments of the 18th, Moscow says the United States has made it understood that it does not intend even to partially withdraw troops. The domestic service and Radio Peace and Progress on the 18th attribute to Ziegler the statement that the troop withdrawal may be "slowed down or completely halted" and that the Vietnamization program is not connected with a complete troop withdrawal.

A Moscow broadcast in English to the United Kingdom on the 16th, discussing Secretary Laird's 15 January statement in Los Angeles on defense budget cuts, claims that he said that 50 percent of U.S. troops would remain in South Vietnam and that they would be "mostly" combat troops. In fact Laird said that after the United States withdraws a "substantial" number of troops, half of the remaining men would be combat troops; this remark is reported accurately in a 17 January TASS report of Laird's remarks in Santa Monica on the 16th.

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MOSCOW BROADCASTS OF U.S. POW MESSAGES

In English to North America on 19 January, Radio Moscow broadcasts Christmas messages from 15 U.S. pilots held prisoner in the DRV. Moscow says that the U.S. State Department has "long been conducting a stubborn propaganda campaign" accusing the DRV of "mistreating" American prisoners and that these messages show that the U.S. authorities are "not telling the truth." The messages are virtually the same as those previously carried by Hanoi radio and by the "Voice of Vietnam" (Hanoi radio) broadcast over Havana radio, although Moscow has omitted portions of some of the statements. Moscow's initial announcement on the 16th that the messages would be broadcast said that the tapes were recorded by Hanoi radio and loaned to Radio Moscow.* The broadcast thus far has been repeated a number of times through the 20th. There is no available Moscow acknowledgment of the State Department's 19 January protest.

On 21 January Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia a version of a message urging GIs in South Vietnam to support the peace movement back home, from a Marine private named Sweeney who is quoted as saying he is "now serving with the people of South Vietnam in their fight against the aggressive war." Another version of the message was included in the 19 January Radio Moscow broadcast, and a statement attributed to him was carried in a Moscow broadcast in English to North America on 17 January which identified him as an American "prisoner of war." In that statement, however, Sweeney was represented as saying that he "crossed over to the side of the Vietnamese people" on 22 February. Several similar statements attributed to Sweeney were publicized by LPA and Liberation Radio during December, and reports of his alleged defection were carried by LPA and Hanoi Radio last March and April.

* A service message from VNA's Moscow office to its headquarters in Hanoi said that Hanoi and Liberation Radio broadcasts had been unintelligible in several localities of the USSR, and that even with "the embassy's special equipment" reception of Hanoi radio had been poor. It went on to say that the Moscow radio broadcasts of the "air pirates" tape recordings "on our humanitarian policy" had created "very big repercussions in the United States and in the world" and that a number of radio stations have asked Radio Moscow for the recordings.

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Huong Lap village and launched artillery attacks from positions south of the DMZ against Vinh Son village, both of which are located in the northern part of the DMZ. Claiming that the alleged bombings and strafings caused damage in human lives and property, the protest says routinely that the DRV Government "strongly denounces and severely condemns these acts of war" and demands that the United States immediately stop all violations of DRV sovereignty and security.

The last DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest was broadcast on 4 December, charging the United States with shelling Vinh Son village "from positions south of the demilitarized zone." The most recent protest against alleged B-52 bombings appeared on 28 October.

WAR CRIMES STATEMENT On 20 January, VNA reports that the DRV War Crimes Commission issued a statement on the 17th on "crimes" committed by the United States since President Nixon's inauguration. In addition to discussing alleged crimes against South Vietnam, the statement claims that 11,980 reconnaissance sorties were made to carry out 7,970 reconnaissance missions over the DRV. It asserts that tactical aircraft launched a total of 657 attacks from the 17th to the 19th parallels, and it makes the unusual claim that in December 1969 U.S. aircraft "even went beyond the 20th parallel to attack Son Tien village, Quang Hoa district (west of Thanh Hoa)."

Although the statement claims that B-52's were used against Quang Binh Province and Vinh Linh area, no total number for the alleged "raids" is cited. Nor are statistics cited to support the charge of use of artillery from ships and from south of the demilitarized zone against the DMZ.

The VNA account of the 15 January Paris session reports some of Lau's specific charges against the President for stepping up the war in 1969. Lau cites no sources for his statistics, which vary from those in the war crimes statement. He claims that in 1969 there were 11,810 violations of DRV airspace by reconnaissance planes, 600 attacks by tactical aircraft, 40 raids by B-52's, and nearly 300 attacks by U.S. ships or by artillery from south of the demilitarized zone. VNA also notes his routine assertions that maximum pressure has been applied by the United States on the South Vietnam battlefield and that U.S.-ARVN sweep operations in 1969 were double those of 1968.

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COMMENT ON COORDINATED POLITICAL, MILITARY STRUGGLE

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Hanoi on 19 January broadcasts an article from the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which discusses the relationship between political and military struggle, calling it a "very important and urgent requirement" for victory. The article says the victories over the past year have been directed at the "two core forces": the military forces and "political bondage apparatus." It claims that these military victories have proved that people's uprisings can be supported by annihilating the allies and that, conversely, accelerating uprisings can create the necessary conditions to annihilate the allies. The article stresses that military action can help the people to rise up and build revolutionary administrations and that these "liberated" areas then provide a rear base for the military forces.

LIBERATION FRONT Liberation Radio on the 15th carries an editorial from GIAI PHONG (Liberation) which outlines requirements for "effecting a new guerrilla high tide." The paper says it is necessary to "urgently" step up the guerrilla war and, in close cooperation with "political and proselyting activities," create a spring offensive and simultaneous uprising movement. It is also necessary, the editorial says, to "realize the mass nature of the movement," to step up propaganda and educational activities, and to mobilize the masses. It adds that regional forces must be built into very skillful political task forces and troop proselyting forces.

On the 17th, Liberation Radio broadcasts what it calls a station editorial to mark the "10th anniversary of spontaneous uprisings in the delta on 17 January 1960." It says that violence cannot be viewed simply as armed struggle and that the assessment of the balance of forces cannot be based only upon military forces of both sides. To do so, it adds, could make it impossible to appreciate the revolution's strength. The editorial says that in the spontaneous uprisings the people relied mainly on "political violence" and coordinated with the armed forces, and it asserts that the joining of armed struggle with political struggle is the basic form of revolutionary violence "in the general uprising movement just as in the present general offensive."

Liberation Radio on the 15th broadcasts the 4 January circular on "stepping up the political offensive and the proselyting work" during Tet which was issued by the PRG Information and Culture Ministry and the NFLSV. The circular says that in order to follow Ho, who no longer can send a Tet greeting, the people must accelerate political motivation and troop proselyting.

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PREPARATIONS FOR VIETNAM WORKERS PARTY 40TH ANNIVERSARY

DRV media report widespread, low-level emulation and propaganda activities to mark the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) on 3 February. On 18 January Hanoi releases a VWP Secretariat circular and party slogans on the occasion. Also in connection with the anniversary, VNA on 20 January carries a summary of a book entitled "40 Years of Activity of the Party" which it says was "recently" compiled by the Department of Party History and Research under the Central Committee. NHAN DAN, according to VNA, has published the book "part by part." In addition, VNA from 14 to 17 January carries old documents related to the anniversary. These include an excerpt from "The Revolutionary Road," a series of lectures by Ho Chi Minh, published in 1926 in Canton; Ho's article entitled "Lenin and the Colonial Peoples," published in PRAVDA on 27 January 1924; an appeal to the Vietnamese people by Ho on 18 February 1930; an appeal by Ho in June 1941; and a speech by Ho made at the ceremony on 5 January 1960 celebrating the 30th anniversary of the party.

Press comment on the VWP anniversary comes in a 13 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial which stresses the critical position of party leadership in the army.

SECRETARIAT
CIRCULAR

Hanoi radio in its domestic service on 18 January broadcasts the VWP Central Committee Secretariat's circular which notes that, in compliance with the Politburo resolution of April 1969 on the four major anniversaries in 1970,* the Secretariat is issuing guidelines for commemorating the party anniversary.

In celebrating the party anniversary, the circular calls for the taking of "practical, specific measures" to comply with Ho's testament, which it says is a "long-term task for the entire party, army, and people." It points out the necessity of "propagandizing and disseminating" the Politburo's and Council of Minister's resolution on the 1970 state plan to step up production and it warns of the necessity to continue the "anti-U.S. national salvation resistance" until final victory, explaining that

* The four major anniversaries to be celebrated in 1970 are the 40th anniversary of the party, the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birthday, the 80th anniversary of Ho's birthday, and the 25th anniversary of the DRV's founding. The Politburo resolution on the four major anniversaries was not released until 8 July 1969, when it was broadcast by Hanoi radio. For a discussion of the resolution and surrounding propaganda see the FBIS SURVEY, 17 July 1969, page 13.

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the combat and combat-serving tasks and military duties must be fulfilled in order to contribute toward aiding the front. (Although the resolution was mentioned previously, in a 26 December NHAN DAN editorial, its text is not known to have appeared in DRV propaganda.)

The circular notes in addition that attention must be paid to teaching the party's revolutionary tradition by reading "The Party's 40 Years of Activities" which was published in NHAN DAN; that an emulation movement to "develop production, serve combat, and prepare to fight" must be launched; and that the task of improving the quality of party members and admitting members into the party must be prepared and organized.* (Hanoi radio notes that a Politburo resolution addressed to this subject will be sent later.) The circular further states that a "political and theoretical activities drive" to study statements by leading comrades must be organized. (The radio again says that a particular circular on this from the party's Propaganda and Training Department will be issued.)

In organizing the celebrations of the anniversary, the circular says that each locality and base will be responsible and commemoration statements should include "a summary of the struggle process of the party and the local party committee, the present duty of the entire party and the local party committee, and the immediate tasks facing the locality or unit."

ANNIVERSARY
SLOGANS

VNA on 18 January releases 31 slogans which it says are published by all Hanoi papers to celebrate the party anniversary. Slogans are not usually issued on the party anniversary, but the present slogans generally follow the pattern of those issued each year in the past for May Day and to jointly mark the 19 August anniversary of the August Revolution and 2 September DRV National Day.** In honor of the party anniversary, the slogan list

* The Politburo resolution on the four major anniversaries released on 8 July had noted the necessity of preparing a "brief summary of the 40-year history of the party which will be used as a reading document for party members and the masses." The resolution had also said that one of the plans for preparations for the anniversaries was "to organize and recruit a new class of party members."

** In 1968 Hanoi reduced the number of slogans issued for May Day and in August, from 36 slogans in August 1967 to 24 in May 1968 and 23 in August 1968. (See the 21 August 1968 FBIS TRENDS for a discussion of changes in 1968 slogans.) In 1969 the list of May Day slogans was somewhat longer than the previous year--29 slogans. Only eight slogans were issued last August, however, possibly because of Ho's illness.

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contains a greeting on the occasion and an additional appeal to the party, army, and people to "unite closely around the party's Central Committee" and act upon Ho's testament to defeat the United States and build socialism. The traditional concluding slogan--"long live President Ho"--is changed to: "eternal attitude to the great President Ho Chi Minh."

For the first time since August 1967, the slogans specifically refer to the Soviet Union and China in offering thanks for "precious support and assistance," there are separate slogans for the Soviet Union, for China, and for "the parties, governments, and peoples of brotherly socialist countries." Inexplicably, VNA's account of the slogans on the party anniversary does not include the usual declaration "long live the socialist countries' solidarity based on Marxism-Leninism and international proletarianism."

Also for the first time since August 1967, there is a slogan addressed to national minorities in the DRV, calling for solidarity and efforts to develop their economy and culture. And, for the first time in the same period, there is a slogan calling upon Chinese residents in the DRV to strengthen "Vietnam-China solidarity and contribute to the struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation, and socialist construction."

Another change is the addition to the slogan on agriculture of a call for cooperative farmers to "correctly apply the regulations on cooperatives" The cooperative regulations were released last August and the importance of their implementation has been repeatedly underlined in propaganda since then.

Separate May 1969 slogans hailing the NFLSV and the South Vietnam Alliance are not repeated. The PRG--formed in June 1969, but not mentioned in the brief August 1969 DRV slogans--is saluted along with the NFLSV in the current slogan welcoming southern "victories" under their leadership.

A slogan first used in May 1969, calling for the development of North Vietnamese forces and efforts to "fulfill the duties of the great rear toward the great frontline," is not repeated in the current party slogans and did not appear in the abbreviated slogans last August. However, there is a slogan, like one last August, which declares: "Let us . . . persevere in and step up the war of resistance to U.S. aggression, for national salvation, till total victory, liberate the South, defend the North, and proceed to the peaceful reunification of the country."

Slogans used in May 1969 and earlier, addressed to the communications and transportation service, are not repeated.

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--QUAN DOI NHAN DAN The 13 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial hails the party's accomplishments during the last 40 years but then offers a list of injunctions to party members in the armed forces which may reflect morale problems and areas in which the party's role has not been adequately carried out. The editorial stresses the importance of the party and party members, declaring that they are responsible for leadership and organization, that the officers and men will have confidence and determination to fight "only if party members are animated by a staunch spirit," and that combatants will have determination to fulfill missions well "only if army party chapters are animated by a firm determination to win." Among other things, the editorial orders that party members "must volunteer to go to any battlefield" and be ready to leave, must fight well, must be unafraid and "not retreat before deadly situations," must take the initiative in attacking and achieve outstanding performances, must not hesitate or lose an opportunity for victory, and must overcome difficulties and hardships and "fight tirelessly over a long period of time."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW PRESSES PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AS PEKING MUTES POLEMICS

Moscow's renewed anti-Chinese campaign has emerged across a broad front similar to Soviet propaganda offensives prior to the standdown that followed the September meeting between Premiers Kosygin and Chou En-lai. A TASS report on 17 January, carried in the central press the next day, adds CPR economic developments to the range of polemical targets. In Soviet broadcasts, comment presenting Moscow's side of the conflict has been given worldwide dissemination; programs beamed to CPR border areas have begun taking note of conditions in minority areas, with a Uighur refugee's talk in his native language deploring the plight of his people in Sinkiang; and ominous warnings have been conveyed to the Chinese regarding the devastating power of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. There has also been a revived reference--thus far the sole one--to "Mao and his group," a crucial formula implying a faction without legitimate authority and thus justifying interventionist tactics.

The 9 January TASS attack on the Chinese war preparations campaign and the subsequent polemical surge indicate a shift in Moscow's approach toward a tougher line during the current, second stage in the Sino-Soviet talks. Though the TASS report attributed Chinese militarization to domestic needs, a menacing tone has arisen in subsequent comment drawing implications in the foreign sphere. A LITERARY GAZETTE article on 14 January--which contains the reference to "Mao and his group"--warns the Chinese that their war preparations intensify international tension, are "clearly provocative," and "in essence signify preparations for aggression." Similarly, an article in the weekly NEW TIMES (No. 3) states that the Chinese measures "might have been regarded as China's internal affairs" had the militarization of all activities in the CPR "not been accompanied by frenzied military preparations and the expansion of arms."

Most notably, an article in the military paper RED STAR on 21 January--available in a TASS summary--introduces an element that would be likely to figure in a Soviet rationale for sterner measures against the Chinese. In addition to discussing the internal reasons for the Chinese campaign, according to TASS, the article "also emphasizes the external, strategic aspect of the large-scale war preparations" in China. Referring to Peking's "expansionist, adventuristic course" vis-a-vis neighboring countries, the article observes that it "is clear that the Maoists today can hardly reckon on success of any big armed gamble." But the article then adds: "However, it should be borne in mind that the Maoists have long been gradually gathering strength." This marks the first time since the Kosygin-Chou meeting that Moscow has evoked the

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specter of a growing Chinese military potential menacing other countries. It also represents the most forthright expression of hawkish sentiments to come out of Moscow during this period.

While Moscow has been conducting a wide-ranging polemical campaign, Peking has muted the major propaganda guns which had thundered defiance at the Soviets at the turn of the year. Thus Peking's end-of-the-decade pronouncements may have been intended as an exercise in the "irreconcilable" ideological struggle which the Chinese had promised in their announcement last October of the agreement to hold talks with the Soviets. As for the negotiations front, the report in the Hong Kong paper TA KUNG PAO on 9 January, serving as a channel for leaking Peking's views on the talks, was restrained in tone and reflected a continuing interest in defusing current tensions.

MOSCOW ON PEKING TALKS The rising level of Soviet polemics has included various-- and more frequent--references to the Peking talks, though these are still confined to foreign broadcasts. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on 15 January expresses regret at the CPR war preparedness campaign and dissemination of anti-Soviet "fabrications" in the CPR at the time when the delegations of the two governments are holding negotiations in Peking. Similar sentiments are expressed on the 16th in a widely broadcast Radio Moscow commentary which stresses the need for the Chinese side to "show its goodwill and sincerity" and to "take a positive and realistic approach" at the Peking talks in order to "resolve the difficulty concerning relations between our two countries."

In a rare reference to the border issue, the 16 January commentary emphasizes that the Soviet Union "is concentrating its efforts on settling the border problem with China" and, recalling that the Soviet Union proposed Sino-Soviet talks on border issues as early as 1964, observes that "negotiations are the only reasonable method to end the abnormal state of relations" between the two countries. References to the border issue have been rare in Soviet propaganda since the Peking talks began.

BROADCASTS TO CHINA Abandoning the indirect and allegorical polemics in which Moscow had been presenting its case to Chinese audiences, broadcasts beamed to the CPR are now criticizing Peking directly. Attention has been directed to the sensitive matter of party reorganization, with a broadcast in Mandarin on the 17th, for example, deploring the dominant role being given the military in rebuilding the CCP. A Peace and Progress commentary on the 18th complains that a pro-Soviet label is being pinned on elements which the Peking leaders fear will regain their past role in the party.

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Broadcasts in minority languages have again begun to take note of conditions in border areas, as in a Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mongolian on the 17th describing the militarization campaign in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet. And on the 16th the Tashkent station broadcasting in Uighur carried a talk by a Uighur refugee concerning Maoist repression in Sinkiang. Material of this sort has been featured in harsh Soviet propaganda campaigns in the past.

While much of the Soviet comment beamed to China seeks to counteract the portrayal of an imminent Soviet invasion, insisting that the USSR has never had any intention of attacking the CPR, a 13 January broadcast in Radio Moscow's regular program for the PLA calls attention to the massive destruction which a nuclear attack on China could inflict. Though China is not mentioned directly, the broadcast takes clear aim at the Maoist strategy of people's war--it actually quotes a Maoist maxim on guerrilla warfare--and warns pointedly that an enemy could launch devastating nuclear strikes without sending troops to invade the country. This argument in effect undercuts the sort of military preparations currently being undertaken by the Chinese in the face of a putative Soviet invasion.

In recent years Radio Moscow's program for the PLA has sought to play upon discontent within the Chinese professional military over Maoist military doctrine. Attention has characteristically been directed to the outmoded weapons systems of the PLA, to the perversion of its mission in the course of the cultural revolution, and to its impotence in the arena of great powers. As shown in the 13 January broadcast, this message can have particularly ominous overtones in the context of acutely strained Sino-Soviet relations.

Last March, following the border clashes that month, the Soviets were explicitly frank in conveying warnings to the Chinese. Though limiting these threats to broadcasts to China over Radio Peace and Progress, the Soviets coupled chilling descriptions of their nuclear capability with denigrating accounts of what the Chinese could throw into a major contest of arms. The Soviet threats evoked widespread Western comment, prompting Moscow to issue a rebuttal--carried only in an English-language broadcast to Britain on 21 March--denouncing the British for purveying "the provocative false rumor of possible Soviet nuclear action against China."

SINO-SOVIET- In offering a variety of explanations for the Chinese
U.S. TRIANGLE war preparedness campaign, some Radio Peace and Progress
broadcasts in Mandarin suggest that the fanning of anti-
Soviet sentiment and war psychosis is designed to distract attention from
the recently revived U.S.-Chinese discussions in Warsaw. Radio Peace and
Progress continues to inform Chinese listeners about developments in U.S.-
Chinese relations, observing, for example, that the fact of the two sides'

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meeting in each other's embassies "demonstrates the highly secretive nature of the talks." Such propaganda comes against the background of the pervasive Soviet line that the CPR's war preparations and anti-Soviet activities give aid and comfort to "imperialism."

Earlier in the month LIFE ABROAD (No. 2)--a weekly publication containing foreign press comment which Moscow characteristically uses to raise issues which it is reticent to address directly--concluded a selection of articles dealing with U.S.-Chinese relations with a comment by Kravchenko which put the onus for reviving the U.S.-Chinese Warsaw talks squarely on Washington. Kravchenko suggested that the change in Washington's China policy would have been welcomed if it had been intended to improve the international atmosphere, but that since the current overtures were made "in patently anti-Soviet tones" amid "fantasies about an illusory 'Moscow threat' to the CPR," they simply reflected "the insidious attempts of warlike circles in the United States to complicate the relations between the USSR and the CPR."

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FRG - GDR RELATIONS

ULBRICHT REPEATS FAMILIAR TREATY DEMANDS, CRITICIZES BRANDT

In a lengthy prepared statement read at a press conference on 19 January, GDR State Council Chairman Ulbricht leaves the door open for talks with West Germany on a treaty on the establishment of relations between the two German states. But he shows little signs of flexibility, repeating such long-standing demands on Bonn as the demand for "unreserved recognition of the status quo in Europe, particularly the recognition of the GDR as a state under international law." He also calls for recognition of the borders between the GDR and the FRG as state borders and for Bonn's renunciation of the claim to sole representation of the German people.

Ulbricht says that West German Chancellor Brandt in his 14 January speech, while he acknowledged the existence of two German states and indicated he no longer wanted to talk about reunification, "did not dare to define his attitude" toward the GDR's draft treaty, forwarded to FRG authorities on 18 December. And Ulbricht is critical of Brandt's proposal for negotiations with the GDR on a non-use-of-force agreement. Noting that the GDR draft treaty contains such a proposal, he says that if Bonn really wants to renounce the use of force against the GDR, "then it first of all has to prove the sincerity of its intention by recognizing the GDR as a sovereign German state and by establishing equal relations with her."

Ulbricht "welcomes" the fact that talks have begun between the FRG and the USSR on renunciation of force and says that "we for the time being are waiting for the outcome of the talks between the Soviet Union and the FRG before we . . . conclude a treaty with the FRG." He adds that the problems of a non-use-of-force agreement belong to the "basic problems which should be discussed during the negotiation which we are still ready to hold."

Observing that "it is known" that Bonn has drawn up a draft treaty, Ulbricht advises Brandt to consult with workers in West Germany about their attitude toward the GDR's draft treaty before sending the West German document to the GDR. In answer to a question at the press conference regarding a possible referendum in West Germany on the draft treaty, he says "we have no objection" to it although this is a matter for the West Germans themselves to decide.

* This is Ulbricht's first press conference since 15 June 1961.

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Ulbricht also takes Brandt to task for his reservations about a European security conference, observing that while no European state has linked its participation in a conference to "some kind of precondition," Brandt alone has made the FRG participation "dependent upon the outcome of talks between the two German states." (Brandt stated on 14 January that FRG participation "would be of little use unless some positive beginning in the inter-German sphere has materialized.") "Brandt knows as well as we do," Ulbricht says, that the negotiations between the two German states will require a long period of time and that the early convening of a European security conference could be significant for the mitigation of tension between the FRG and the GDR.

TASS REPORT A fairly extensive TASS account of Ulbricht's statement on the 19th includes the assertion that a renunciation-of-force agreement demands recognition of the GDR but pointedly omits the reference to the FRG-USSR talks on renunciation of force. The TASS report on the question-and-answer session of the press conference also ignores the reply to a question by IZVESTIYA correspondent Stepanov in which Ulbricht referred to the talks between Moscow and Bonn. These omissions are consistent with the USSR's virtual silence on the talks which opened in Moscow in early December.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW PLAYS UP ISSUE OF WESTERN ARMS TO ISRAEL

While Moscow's recent critical attention to the U.S. proposals for a Middle East settlement diminishes somewhat, routine comment continues to attack the proposals for failing in particular to call for "unconditional" Israeli withdrawal. Moscow currently focuses on the issue of Western arms to Israel in support of charges that the United States shows "hypocrisy" in seeking to project a balanced U.S. attitude toward a Middle East settlement when in fact Washington backs Israeli "aggression" and thwarts a political settlement. In this connection, the propaganda cites reports of shipments of surplus U.S. arms to Israel via the Belgian port of Zeebrugge, modernization and conversion of British Centurion tanks for delivery to Israel, and statements by U.S. "Zionist organizations" and American Congressmen, particularly by Senator Javits during his current Middle East visit, urging the Administration to consider additional military and economic aid.

RED STAR observes on 16 January that the main "and for certain types of military equipment the only source of supply for Israel remains the United States." The paper insists that even the policy of "permanent military pressure" will not bring the desired results for Tel Aviv, since "despite the objective difficulties" the "anti-imperialist Arab front" is being strengthened, as are the "defense capacity" of the Arab armies and the activity of the "Palestinian partisans." RED STAR adds that the Palestinian movement "will play an ever increasing role in the balance of power" in the Middle East conflict. In the last such remarks on a Palestinian fedayeen role, Belyayev in the 26 November LIFE ABROAD and a Koryavin domestic service commentary on 19 December had said that Tel Aviv would increasingly have to take into account the "Palestinian partisans," which Belyayev called a "new political factor" and Koryavin described as a "mighty force."

ISRAELI RAIDS
IN THE UAR

Apparently concerned over the Egyptians' inability to respond to recent Israeli raids inside UAR territory, Moscow tells its domestic audience that these "pinpricks" have been militarily unsuccessful, while lecturing Arab listeners on army morale and fighting spirit and advising them to study Soviet experience in these matters.

A Ryzhikov domestic service commentary on the 16th dismisses as a "lot of fuss" reports by Western correspondents and news agencies about Israeli "attempts" to bomb "regions deep within the UAR." Ryzhikov says the uproar concerns "Israeli raids on Egyptian troop positions in the region of al-Khankah, 15 kilometers northeast of Cairo, and at-Tall

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al-Kabir, 65 kilometers northeast of the UAR capital." He quotes "in full" the UAR military communique in connection with "the last attempt" to penetrate Egypt, on 13 January, to show that "from a purely military point of view these raids were not successful." But the Israeli general staff, according to Ryzhikov, "is hardly guided by military motives when it sends its pilots into areas dangerously close to Cairo"; rather, by "these pinpricks" Israel tries to achieve the "political aim" of upsetting the UAR's progressive regime. He cites AFP as reporting from Tel Aviv that "local observers" consider the very appearance of Israeli aircraft close to Cairo as sure to bring "important political and psychological consequences."

Soviet concern is conveyed in a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 19th which discourses on the meaning of the "morale factor in war," observing that Soviet experience in "bringing up soldiers morally and politically is the center of much attention by military experts" both of the socialist countries and of other "friendly countries, including the Arab countries." The broadcast explains that "to strengthen the fighting spirit of the armies and subsequently raise their morale is of primary importance to the Arab countries confronting the imperialist and Zionist aggressors," and it concludes pointedly that Soviet experience in this regard "could be of importance to the Arab countries."

An Arabic-language commentary on the 20th, on the visit of a Soviet parliamentary delegation to the UAR, speaks of the "special importance" of Soviet assistance to the UAR, which is "bearing the main burden" of the struggle against Israeli "aggression." It defensively rejects "imperialist and Israeli propaganda" warnings of the "danger of Soviet infiltration," contrasting the "noble" aims of Soviet assistance to the Arabs with the ulterior motives of Israel's imperialist "protectors." Such intrigues by enemies of Soviet-Arab friendship, it declares, "have received and will continue to receive a suitable reply, whether from the Arab peoples or from the Soviets."

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N I G E R I A

MOSCOW IMPLICATES U.S. DIRECTLY IN CULPABILITY FOR WAR

Continuing to contrast benevolent Soviet support for the winning side with "hypocritical" Western aid offers to victims of a war allegedly fanned by the West, Moscow tends increasingly to name the United States in denigrating the role of the Western powers. A 17 January RED STAR article reviewed by TASS, charging that "the imperialist powers were responsible for the conflict," says "the secessionists' main helper is the U.S. CIA" and quotes unspecified Lagos sources as claiming that "the CIA financed and recruited American fliers for an 'air bridge' to Africa."

A broadcast to Africa over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 16th goes a step further in portraying the United States as a supplier of arms to Biafra and an "enemy" of Nigeria. Although the United States posed as a supporter of the Federal Government, the broadcast says, "the Americans had secretly stored stockpiles of arms in Ghana which were transported to Biafra." The Americans also, it adds, "supplied the separatists with arms airlifted from Portugal and South Africa." Referring to reports of Western offers of aid to Nigeria, the broadcast says that now "the Nigerians can clearly see that the hand proffered to them with so-called aid is covered with the blood of millions of people lost in the fratricidal war that had been incited by the imperialists."

There are also slaps at the British, with a TASS London-dated line dispatch on the 15th saying that "so-called humanitarian" concern on the part of British capitalists is in fact concern for their own profits from oil and cacao interests in Nigeria.

Moscow commentaries only occasionally suggested specific U.S. and British complicity in past propaganda on the war, normally referring in general terms to the "Western imperialists." This circumspection carried over into initial Soviet comment on the Federal Government's victory. Although some of the comment is now more explicit, the most frequent propaganda line is still a generalized allegation that "the imperialists" are trying to exploit the sufferings of the Ibos for their own--chiefly economic--advantage.

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USSR AND SPAIN

SPANISH CP DEFENSIVE ON REPORT OF MADRID-MOSCOW CONTACT

A Spanish CP Executive Committee statement dealing with a variety of subjects, broadcast over the party's clandestine Radio Espana Independiente on 18 January, contains the first direct comment by the party on Western press reports of a late-December Moscow airport meeting between the Spanish Foreign Minister and senior Soviet officials. In a defensive vein, the statement expresses "surprise" over the reports and observes that they "have not been confirmed by Soviet sources." It asserts that even if the reports should prove accurate, the meeting and its implications would not affect the party's struggle against the Franco regime.

Observing that socialist states "do not interfere at all" in party affairs, the statement denounces as "a slander if not an illusion" a Spanish journalist's contention that a rapprochement between Spain and "a socialist country" might "influence the pace and determination" of the party's struggle. The statement reiterates the party's position on the "untimeliness" of establishing "any type of political relations" with a regime imposed "with the support of Hitler and Mussolini--a regime, that is, moreover, nearing its end." In a 5 January interview over the same radio, party Secretary General Santiago Carrillo had used similar language in expressing adamant opposition to relations between Spain and the socialist countries.*

The 18 January statement calls upon Poland, which has consular relations with Spain, to refuse to sell the Franco regime coal that would be used to offset a shortage resulting from the strike of Asturian miners. Declaring that socialist countries' "solidarity" with the Spanish people "has been a constant fact" to date, the party explains that it has therefore asked the PZPR to deny Spanish news reports concerning the proposed coal shipment. No disclaimer has yet been heard from Polish media.

* See the 14 January issue of the TRENDS for a discussion of Carrillo's statement and background on frictions between the Spanish CP and the CPSU in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE DECRIES "TROTSKIYITE" PLOT, HINTS WESTERN COMPLICITY

Prague media have reacted to efforts by Western news media to "belittle" an alleged Trotskyite conspiracy unearthed by the Czechoslovak regime on 12 January, insisting that the arrests made in the case were necessary to remove a serious threat posed by a subversive group bent on "overthrowing the socialist regimes in Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union." Moscow has not mentioned the case, which represents the Husak regime's first open attack on any group other than the "rightwing opportunist, counter-revolutionary" elements blamed for the 1968 events.

The alleged plot was first divulged on the 12th in a brief Czech Republic Interior Ministry announcement on the uncovering of "an antistate organization which used conspiratorial methods and sought to hamper the consolidation process and evoke political crises," in "the spirit of Trotskyist ideas." A Prague radio commentary on the 15th notes Western commentators' characterizations of "this new political force" as "a mixture of the ideas of Trotsky, Count Kropotkin, Mao Tse-tung, and other leftwing extremists, interbred with all sorts of anarchosyndicalist, Albanian-Chinese, Dutschkeite, Cohn-Benditist, and other so-called contributions to Marxism." The commentator goes on to suggest that the plot goes deeper and to hint at external financing by "people about whom a great deal is known by the FBI and CIA gentlemen in the United States." He adds darkly that "someone" is clearly "exploiting the ignorance and lack of experience of a section of the youth." Elaborating the motives behind the alleged plot, he suggests that a Trotskyite "Revolutionary Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia" was envisaged as "a quick substitute for the disastrous intellectual sterility" of the liberal Dubcek-Smrkovsky regime.

An article by Hecko in RUDE PRAVO on 17 January is similarly vague in its hints at Western complicity. Under the title "In the Service of a Foreign Power," Hecko says nothing more concrete than that "many facts prove unequivocally" the subversive organization's "connections with various Trotskyite organizations in the West." It emphasizes that members of the organization in Czechoslovakia saw "an example for themselves in certain extremist groups in the West--in anarchy, disorder, riots, and chaos proclaimed by them."

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

MEETING OF EUROPEAN CP'S IN MOSCOW GETS SCANT PUBLICITY

A terse communique on an unheralded meeting of 28 European communist parties--including the Yugoslav--on 14-15 January, released by TASS on the 15th, says the participants "exchanged views on problems of collective security and peace on the European continent," in addition to exchanging information on plans for observing the Lenin centenary. It adds that the meeting passed in "a spirit of comradely cooperation," but provides no details of the discussion and says nothing about any agreement.

A few brief, passing references to the meeting appear in the context of Soviet comment pushing the idea of a European security conference--remarks to the effect that the large gathering of European parties to discuss European security in Moscow shows the widespread concern about the subject. Sofia comments briefly to the same effect. The absence of any advance publicity for the meeting and the dearth of comment on it after its close suggest that Moscow neither expected nor succeeded in achieving much in the way of concrete results, intending rather to solicit support for the Soviet approach to European security and to gauge the nature and extent of dissent it may expect from the independent-minded parties.

YUGOSLAV POSITION An account of an address delivered at the Moscow meeting by Yugoslav Presidium member Belovski, released by TANYUG on 17 January, is the only available report so far on the substance of any of the participants' statements. Lobbying for the Yugoslav position on the anachronistic nature of power blocs, Belovski's remarks--and Belgrade's publicity for them--presage less than smooth sailing for efforts to achieve united European communist backing for Moscow's view of European security.

Where Moscow propaganda traditionally speaks of liquidation of the rival European blocs as a distant, ultimate goal obtainable only when NATO ceases to be "aggressive," Belovski's speech elaborates the Yugoslav position--essentially shared by Romania--that the future for Europe "does not lie in preserving bloc divisions, either in their coexistence or in future pacts between existing blocs." Declaring that Europe is undergoing "a process of emancipation," he says the European peoples are seeking "much wider space for an active role in social and international relations than the existing structures allow." Calling for a Europe of "independent and equal" states, Belovski goes on to urge support for UN principles and by implication attacks the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty: Relations among all European states, he says, should be based "on foundations of sovereignty, independence, equality, and noninterference in the internal affairs of others for whatever reasons--economic, political, military, or ideological."

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Belovski also registers Yugoslav support for "a congress of European peoples," which was apparently a subject of discussion at the Moscow meeting. In a 24 April 1967 speech at the Karlovy Vary conference of European communist parties, Brezhnev had noted that "some public circles in Europe" had called for the convening of a "congress of the peoples of Europe on the broadest possible basis" to deal with European security problems. Such a congress, he added, "might give new impetus to the development of a mass movement" for peace and European security. The idea was followed up in the main document issued by the June 1969 international communist party conference in Moscow, which suggested that "a broad congress of European peoples" be held to prepare for and "facilitate" the European security conference proposed by the Warsaw Pact states in March.

Stressing in his speech at the 28-party meeting that such a congress should not be a gathering of "ideological fellow-minds" like previous European conclaves, Belovski urges that it "bring together responsible representatives of communist and workers parties, social democratic, socialist, various influential bourgeois, democratic, and Christian parties, movements, and groupings"--an assemblage that could afford fertile ground for pressing Yugoslavia's anti-bloc approach.

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